Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems
First meeting: 25–29 March 2019
STATEMENT BY ESTONIA
Agenda item 5(e). Possible options for addressing the humanitarian and security
challenges
Thank you, Mr Chair!
Estonia aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union, and would like
to make a few observations in a national capacity.
We would like to begin by expressing our gratitude to the representatives of States, the
ICRC and civil society organisations for their interventions under previous agenda items.
We think the discussion over the past two days has been constructive, and has added
important details, particularly technical and organisational details, to our knowledge base.
Mr Chair,
At this time, Estonia is not convinced of the need for a new legally binding instrument on
weapon systems with autonomous functions.
We reiterate, however, that any weapon system, irrespective of its autonomous
functionality, must only be used in strict compliance with international law, in particular
international humanitarian law and human rights law. International humanitarian law
remains a robust and dynamic regulatory regime. It can deal with a range of emerging
technologies, including weapon systems with autonomous functionality. Much of the law
has been drafted in a technology-neutral manner. The principle of distinction, the
principle of proportionality, and the obligation to take precautionary measures, provide
examples of that. These rules and principles have been repeatedly mentioned in our
discussions as being fully applicable and relevant to the use of weapon systems with
autonomous functions.
We would like to draw attention to a few more specific rules that we see as particularly
pertinent to these weapons. First, Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions prohibits the use of weapons which cannot be directed at a specific military
objective. Second, the same provision prohibits the use weapons the effects of which
cannot be limited as required by international humanitarian law. Third, Article 57(2) of
Additional Protocol I requires military commanders and operators to take feasible
PERMANENT MISSION OF ESTONIA
TO THE UN AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATIONS IN GENEVA
precautions in the choice of weapons with a view to avoiding, and in any event to
minimising, collateral damage.
Strict compliance with these rules international humanitarian law would go a long way in
addressing the humanitarian concerns that have been raised in relation to weapon systems
with autonomous functions.
We acknowledge, however, that such weapon systems can create uncertainties when it
comes to the interpretation and application of the law. For example, the interventions
made by the ICRC yesterday helpfully highlighted some of the complexities involved
when commanders make contextual assessments required by the law. Such matters merit
further discussion.
Mr Chair,
Estonia has previously indicated its willingness to work towards a practical outcome that
would address the challenges posed by weapon systems with autonomous functions.
In particular, we are supportive of an outcome document containing the relevant
principles, potentially along the lines of a political declaration proposed by Germany and
France. We think that some commonalities have emerged in our discussions, many of
which were reflected in the consensus report adopted last year. Some of these
commonalities seem ripe for consolidation and elaboration in an outcome document.
Obviously, the exact nature and content of such a document would be subject to
negotiations. However, we think that consensus could be reached on at least three points:
First, that international law, in particular international humanitarian law, is fully
applicable to all weapon systems, including those with autonomous functions;
Second, that states ought to put in place practical measures to verify that the
weapons they develop and acquire, including those with autonomous functions,
are capable of being used in accordance with their obligations under international
law;
Third, that states must implement mechanisms of command and control, and
individual accountability, to ensure that all weapon systems, including those with
autonomous functions, are use consistently with the law.
We also see merit in the development of a compilation of best practices or guidelines on
the use of autonomous functionality in military systems. We take this view because the
appropriate human interaction with a weapon system depends significantly on the nature
of the system and its intended operating environment. Therefore, any principle regarding
human control in a political declaration or similar document would likely be of a fairly
abstract character. How to operationalise that principle could be the subject of a more
detailed compilation of best practices or guidelines. More specifically, the best practices
might cover mechanisms by which the reliability and predictability of weapon systems
can be ensured and assessed. In practice, such guidelines could assist states in conducting
legal reviews of weapon systems that have autonomous functions.
Finally, we believe that these options are not mutually exclusive. We note with interest
the proposal made by Portugal to consider the Montreux Document as a template for an
outcome. Indeed, this document was successful both in restating the international
humanitarian law applicable to private military contractors and consolidating related best
practices. The Document has enjoyed considerable support among States and within the
private security industry. It has led to self-regulation within the sector and domestic
legislation in some States. This seems like a model worth considering in our future
deliberations.
We are convinced that the CCW is the most appropriate forum for discussing issues
related to weapon systems with autonomous functions. We would like to assure you, Mr
Chair, of our commitment to continuing the debate with a view to reaching a practical
outcome.
I thank you, Mr Chair!