Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems
First meeting: 25–29 March 2019
STATEMENT BY ESTONIA
Agenda item 5(b). Characterization of the systems under consideration in order to
promote a common understanding on concepts and characteristics relevant to the
objectives and purposes of the Convention
Thank you, Mr Chair!
Permit me to begin by congratulation you on your election as Chair of the GGE. The
Estonian delegation appreciates the practical and detail-oriented approach that you have
taken in organising our work; we have no doubt that under your able guidance we will be
making significant progress.
Estonia aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union, but would like
to make some observations in a national capacity. In response to your invitation to
proceed in a practical manner, we have a few comments directly in response to the
questions that you have posed for us.
First, we see autonomy as a function-specific property.
A ‘weapon system’ – the term used in the name and mandate of this GGE – generally
refers to a weapon along with any associated technology necessary for the operation of
the weapon. Different component parts of such a system necessarily have different
functions or tasks. If we extend our enquiry to weapon platforms – the structures and
systems onto which weapons can be mounted – the range of functions and tasks increases
further.
In different weapon systems and platforms, these functions or tasks may be subject to
different degrees and types of human control. For example, an unmanned aerial combat
vehicle might have significant autonomy in movement (including take-off, navigation and
landing) but no autonomy in targeting.
In our view, therefore, autonomy relates to specific functions or tasks of weapon
systems and platforms, and autonomy can have different degrees with respect to each
of those functions or tasks. As such, we think that the notion of a fully autonomous
weapon system has limited utility.
Second, IHL is potentially important to all functions of weapon systems.
PERMANENT MISSION OF ESTONIA
TO THE UN AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATIONS IN GENEVA
The relevance of IHL to functions involved in target selection and engagement is obvious
because IHL extensively regulates attacks.
But we note here Article 57(1) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. This
provision requires states to take constant care to spare the civilian population, civilians
and civilian objects not just in attacks but in the conduct of military operations more
generally. This suggests that other functions, such as the autonomous movement of a
weapons platform, need to be developed and implemented with the safety of civilians and
civilian object in mind.
That does not mean, however, that the GGE needs to consider the totality of IHL rules in
relation to any autonomous functions of weapon systems or platforms. The GGE operates
within the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. As such it
seems entirely appropriate to focus on the increased autonomy in the critical functions of
a weapon system, that is selecting and engaging targets. As such, platforms that can move
autonomously but rely on a human operator for targeting decisions, properly fall outside
the scope of our discussion.
Second, we consider the environment where a weapon system is deployed to be highly
significant.
To some degree this significance arises from existing international law, which varies
slightly based on the domain of warfare. For example, landmines and naval mines are
addressed by different treaty-based rules.
But even where the applicable rules are the same, the degree and nature of human
oversight required to ensure compliance with IHL depends on the operational
environment. For example, the human control to be exercised over weapon systems in
urban warfare, where the risk of harming civilians is particularly acute, may well be
different from the control required in submarine warfare, where risks to civilians are more
limited.
Attempts in this forum to determine the requisite degree of human control over weapon
systems should be mindful of such legal and operational differences.
Finally, we consider the distinction between anti-personnel and anti-material weapons to
be meaningful in the context of our discussions.
Certainly, anti-materiel weapons, irrespective of any autonomous functionality, can also
cause injury to human beings. Also, IHL rules plainly apply to all weapon systems used
in armed conflict, irrespective of their intended use.
But humanitarian concerns are heightened with respect to certain types of weapons
designed for use against human beings. This is clearly reflected in the focus of some of
the protocols of the CCW and other international law instruments exclusively on antipersonnel
weapons. Also, the existing weapon systems with autonomous functionality
that have been mentioned in this forum are essentially anti-materiel weapons. The
uncertainties about addressing legacy systems with autonomous functionality are
therefore largely confined to anti-materiel weapons.
I thank you, Mr Chair!