Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems
First meeting: 25–29 March 2019
STATEMENT BY ESTONIA
Agenda item 5(c). Further consideration of the human element in the use of lethal
force
Thank you, Mr Chair!
Estonia aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union, and would like
to make a few observations in a national capacity.
Estonia shares the view that humans must retain ultimate control and responsibility in
relation to the use of force in armed conflict. In our view, the need to exercise human
control over the use of force does not arise from any discrete rule of international law.
Rather, human control constitutes a practical means for ensuring that the use of force
complies with international law. Therefore, we put the required human element in the
following general terms: humans must exercise such control over a weapon system as
may be necessary to ensure that the weapon system operates consistently with
international law. The precise nature of control to be exercised will necessarily depend
on the characteristics of the weapon system, and the operational environment.
Mr Chair,
It has been suggested that weapon systems with autonomous functionality are inherently
indiscriminate, because they are unable to distinguish between lawful and unlawful
targets, or to assess the proportionality of collateral damage. We are puzzled by this
approach because weapon systems themselves have no obligation to comply with the law.
International law speaks to States and humans, not to instruments of warfare. Thus, to our
mind, the critical question is whether a weapon system is capable of being used by an
operator consistently with international humanitarian law. This is a question that a State
must answer in the affirmative prior to deploying a weapon.
Commanders and operators, for their part, must use weapons consistently with the law in
the actual conduct of hostilities. They can rely on a weapon system with autonomous
functions only if they are confident that the system, given its fixed and programmable
features, and the operational situation prevailing at the time, would not lead to breaches
of the law or other unintended consequences. This assessment forms a part of the
commander’s and operator’s duty to take precautionary measures under international
humanitarian law.
PERMANENT MISSION OF ESTONIA
TO THE UN AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATIONS IN GENEVA
Mr Chair,
Ensuring compliance with international humanitarian law will require a series of human
interactions with a weapon system. The ‘system of control’ detailed in Australia’s
working paper provides a helpful example of how this might work in practice. We believe
that it is the combination of human interventions undertaken in such a system, rather than
any of them considered in isolation, that must amount to human control necessary for
ensuring compliance with the law.
I thank you, Mr Chair!